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amended and is no longer relevant to
OAL.
AB 88 (Kelley) would have exempted
from the APA the WRCB's adoption or
revision of state policy for water quality
control and water quality control plans
and guidelines; the issuance of waste discharge requirements, permits, and
waivers; and the issuance or waiver of
water quality certifications (see supra AB
3359). This bill died in committee.

■ LITIGATION
In Engelmann v. State Board of Education, 2 Cal. App. 4th 47 (1991) (certified
for partial publication only), the Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed the Sacramento County Superior Court's holding
that the procedures and criteria used by the
State Board of Education in selecting textbooks for use in public schools must be
adopted pursuant to the APA. [ 12: 1 CRLR
29J On March 19, the California Supreme
Court denied the Board's petition for
review, as well as a request for an order
directing full publication.
No petition for review has been filed in
Fair Political Practices Commission v.
Office of Administrative Law, No.
C010924 (Apr. 27, 1992), in which the
Third District Court of Appeal found that
the FPPC's regulatory actions are subject
to review under the APA only as it existed
at the time of the electorate's 1974 approval of the Political Reform Act, which
(among other things) created the FPPC.
[ 11:2 CRLR 44]
In other litigation, the state Water
Resources Control Board's appeal of the
judgment in State Water Resources Control Board and Regional Quality Control
Board, San Francisco Region v. Office of
Administrative Law, No. A054559, is still
pending in the First District Court of Appeal. In a judgment favorable to OAL, the
trial court held that the wetland rules at
issue are regulations within the meaning
of the APA; the rules are not exempt from
the APA; and since the rules were not
adopted pursuant to the APA, they are
unenforceable. [ 12: 1 CRLR 29J

OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
Acting Auditor General:
Kurt Sjoberg
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he Office of the Auditor General
T
(OAG) is the nonpartisan auditing and
investigating arm of the California legislature. OAG is under the direction of the

Joint Legislative Audit Committee
(JLAC), which is comprised of fourteen
members, seven each from the Assembly
and Senate. JLAC has the authority to
"determine the policies of the Auditor
General, ascertain facts, review reports
and take action thereon ... and make recommendations to the Legislature ... concerning the state audit...revenues and expenditures .... " (Government Code section
10501.) OAG may "only conduct audits
and investigations approved by" JLAC.
Government Code section 10527
authorizes OAG "to examine any and all
books, accounts, reports, vouchers, correspondence files, and other records, bank
accounts, and money or other property of
any agency of the state ... and any public
entity, including any city, county, and special district which receives state
funds ... and the records and property of
any public or private entity or person subject to review or regulation by the agency
or public entity being audited or investigated to the same extent that employees
of that agency or public entity have access."
OAG has three divisions: the Financial
Audit Division, which performs the traditional CPA fiscal audit; the Investigative
Audit Division, which investigates allegations of fraud, waste and abuse in state
government received under the Reporting
of Improper Governmental Activities Act
(Government Code sections I 0540 et
seq.); and the Performance Audit
Division, which reviews programs funded
by the state to determine if they are efficient and cost effective.

■ MAJOR PROJECTS
Californians to Vote on OAG's Future. Proposition 159, authored by Senate
Minority Leader Ken Maddy, qualified for
the November 3 California ballot. This
measure would amend the California Constitution to establish OAG with the mandate to conduct independent, non-partisan, professional audits as required by
law or requested by the legislature. This
initiative would also exempt OAG from
the expenditure limits imposed on the
legislature by Proposition 140, and require that not more than 50% · of the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee be composed of members of the same political
party. Because OAG is currently folded
into the legislature's budget, and the legislature must cut its budget by 38% under
Proposition 140, OAG is subject to the
threat of funding decreases or entire
elimination. [ 12: 1 CRLR 3 I}
Also appearing on the November ballot is Proposition 158, authored by
Senator Dan Boatwright. This measure
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would amend the California Constitution
to create an independent Office of Cali fornia Analyst. While this office currently
exists as the Office of the Legislative
Analyst, that office is also under the financial auspices of the legislature and faces
the same threat of fiscal cutback or
elimination as does OAG.

■ RECENT AUDITS
Report No. P-115 (May 1992)
analyzes the Department of Corporations'
(DOC) management of medical surveys
and consumer complaints in its health care
service plan division. Pursuant to the
Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan
Act of 1975, DOC is responsible for
regulating and licensing health care service plans (HCSPs). Among other things,
DOC is required to perform various activities to ensure that HCSPs provide
quality medical care; these activities include onsite medical surveys of every
licensed health plan within specified
tirneframes. Additionally, DOC assists
HCSP members in resolving complaints
against their health plans.
As a result of its review, OAG found
that DOC has not effectively managed its
onsite medical surveys of HCSPs. Although required by law to conduct a survey of each HCSP at least once every five
years, DOC told the legislature in 1986
that it attempts to conduct such surveys of
most HCSPs every three years. However,
OAG found that DOC did not conduct
medical surveys every three years for 56%
of the state's HCSPs from fiscal year
1987-88 through 1990-91. OAG also
found that DOC did not conduct surveys
every five years for 10% of the state's
HCSPs from fiscal year 1986-87 through
1990-91. As a result, OAG noted that
DOC may allow some HCSPs to continue
to operate in a manner inconsistent with
the law and possibly dangerous to their
members' health.
OAG also found that DOC has not
effectively managed the release of its
medical survey reports. Specifically,
OAG found that from fiscal year 1986-87
through 1990-91, 86% of DOC's confidential reports to HCSPs were not issued
within the 90-day period established in
DOC policy; instead, DOC took an
average of 335 days to issue those confidential reports to the health plans. Also,
for 78% of the medical surveys for which
DOC could provide both the HCSPs'
responses and DOC's public reports, DOC
did not release the public reports within 45
days of receipt of the HCSPs' responses,
as is required by DOC policy; rather, DOC
took an average of 164 days to issue those
public reports.
35
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In addition, Health and Safety Code
section 1380(h) requires DOC to make
public specified deficiencies which are
not corrected by HCSPs within thirty days
of notification. However, OAG found that
in 28% of the corrective action plans
reviewed, DOC inappropriately deleted
from the public reports deficiencies that
the HCSPs had not corrected within that
30-day period. OAG also noted that DOC
is required to open for public inspection
reports of all surveys, deficiencies, and
correction plans except for those deficiencies health plans correct within thirty
days. However, OAG found that DOC has
not properly maintained its records of
medical survey information. For example,
during OAG's review of medical surveys,
DOC could not locate 153 of 247 documents requested by OAG.
OAG also found that DOC failed to
clearly state in 25% of the confidential
survey reports reviewed whether or not
the HCSPs were complying with health
care standards. OAG also found that although DOC has the authority to take follow-up and enforcement action, DOC did
not do so in 62% of the medical surveys
reviewed to ensure that HCSPs corrected
cited deficiencies.
Finally, OAG found that DOC failed to
meet its goal of processing complaints
made by members against their health
plans within 45 days in 52% of the complaints OAG reviewed. OAG also noted
that as of January 1992, DOC had a backlog of 599 complaints, some received as
long ago as fiscal year 1988-89.
OAG recommended that the DOC
Commissioner take the following actions:
-establish management controls to ensure that DOC conducts onsite medical
surveys according to its three-year goal
and five-year statutory mandate;
-implement the training plan adopted
in March 1992 for new analysts and update its procedure manual to ensure that
analysts are informed of procedures based
on the Policy Manual implemented in
March 1992;
-ensure that analysts have consistent
supervision and direction in conducting
medical surveys and issuing medical survey reports;
-establish and implement policies and
guidelines to ensure that analysts write
medical survey reports clearly and
uniformly;
-establish and implement policies
regarding instances when DOC deems it
unnecessary to issue medical survey
reports;
-formalize DOC's policy to include
new terminology describing whether
HCSPs meet health care standards;
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-ensure that consumer services repres en ta ti ves comply with applicable
timelines for processing complaints established in DOC's March 1992 Complaint
Manual; and
-ensure that the backlog of pending
complaints is reduced to a level consistent
with DOC's goal in processing complaints.
Report No. 213 (July 1992) is the
fourth in a series of semiannual reports
concerning how the Department of Health
Services (OHS) processes reimbursement
requests for certain prescribed drugs
under the Medi-Cal program; these
reports review OHS' process for counting
and compiling data on drug treatment
authorization requests (TARs) received
and processed from June 1990 through
May 1992.[12:2&3CRLR44; Jl:4CRLR
48; 11:2 CRLR45]
OAG found that OHS received approximately 91,000 drug TARs during the
six months from December 1991 through
May 1992. This represents a 16% increase
in drug TARs since OAG's first review
covering June 1990 thmugh November
1990. According to OAG, the increase
may be attributable to a 25.6% increase in
Medi-Cal beneficiaries eligible to obtain
drugs through the program.
During the last six months of its
review, OAG found that DHS' Medi-Cal
drug units processed approximately 13%
more drug TARs than they did from June
1990 through November 1990. At the
same time, DHS' monthly backlog of drug
TARs received by mail increased to approximately 8,900 by the end of May
1992. Beginning in April 1992, the Stockton drug unit became the unit primarily
responsible for receiving and processing
all mail-in drug TARs. The Stockton unit's
average time for processing mail drug
TARs exceeded the five-working-day
limit required by state law; instead, the
unit is averaging 25 days for processing
mailed-in drug TARs. This represents an
increase over the average of fifteen days
reported in November 1991. However,
OA G also noted that D HS reported recei ving no complaints about its processing of
drug TARs from June I 991 through May
1992.
OAG also noted that DHS' recent
closure of its San Francisco drug unit
reduced the number of personnel available
to process drug TARs and transferred the
drug unit's primary responsibilities to the
two remaining field offices (Stockton and
Los Angeles).

Report No. C-126 (August 1992),
prepared under contract by Rea & Parker,
Inc., estimates the net fiscal impact upon
the state and local governments in San

Diego County of providing public services to undocumented immigrants. OAG's
study defines undocumented immigrants
as foreign nationals residing in the United
States without lawful permission, or
foreign nationals residing in the United
States who have violated the conditions of
their initial legal entrant status. The
benefits analyzed in the study are those
state and local tax payments derived from
or attributable to undocumented immigrants. OAG analyzed costs in the areas
of education, public health services,
criminal justice, and social services
delivery.
The study found that of the 200,000
undocumented immigrants in San Diego
County, 176,810 are in the work force;
87,875 of those have taxes withheld from
their pay. The study estimated that undocumented immigrants generate over
$60 million annually in the form of payroll
taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, gasoline
taxes, vehicle license and registration
fees, California Lottery ticket sales, and
excise taxes.
The study noted that undocumented
immigrants generally tend to commit
crimes in the same proportion as the overall population and represent approximately 12.5% of total felony arrestees in San
Diego County. Based upon the felony arrest percentage for undocumented immigrants, the study found an annual cost
of over $45 million to San Diego County's
law enforcement agency resulting from
undocumented immigrants' illegal activity. Additionally, OAG applied unit
costs for the various judicial stages to the
predicted felony and misdemeanor cases
involving undocumented immigrants to
yield total annual court costs of almost $7
million. OAG also estimated that costs
incurred by the San Diego County District
Attorney and the Public Defender relating
to undocumented immigrants approach
$19 million annually; the annual cost to
the County's Probation Department is $5
million; total incarceration costs for adults
are almost $29 million; and the total annual cost of prosecution and detention for
the juvenile justice system is almost $ 1.5
million. Cumulatively, the study reported
a total cost of over $105 million in
processing undocumented immigrants
through the criminal justice system.
In determining the cost of providing
health services for undocumented immigrants, the study addressed those health
delivery programs which provide significant services to the undocumented immigrant population, such as emergency
and pregnancy-related services under the
Medi-Cal program, emergency transport
by publicly-funded paramedic services,
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and various San Diego County Department of Health Services programs including indigent care at the University of
California at San Diego (UCSD) Medical
Center, community clinics throughout the
County, the treatment of maternal health
problems, preventive child care, and communicable disease treatment at Countyfunded public health clinics. Regarding
Medi-Cal, the study noted that undocumented immigrants are eligible for
"restricted benefits" for emergency and
pregnancy-related medical problems, for
a total annual cost of $30 million, half of
which is the responsibility of the state of
California and half of which is provided
by the federal government. Further indigent care provided by UCSD Medical
Center to undocumented immigrants costs
San Diego County almost $2 million annually. The study further estimated that
undocumented immigrants utilize 9.1 % of
all health services in the County; this overall rate consists of undocumented
immigrants' utilization of 18.3% of public
health and community clinic services and
2.4% of private health care services. The
study estimated that the annual cost of
public health and community clinic services for undocumented immigrants totals
approximately $8.5 million. The study
further applied the overall utilization rate
of9. I% to the County's overall public cost
of ambulance and paramedic services to
yield an estimated annual cost of almost
$ I million attributable to undocumented
immigrants. The study concluded that the
total annual state and local public costs of
health service delivery to undocumented
immigrants is close to $27 million.
In terms of the cost of providing public
education for undocumented immigrants,
the study noted that an estimated 12,000
undocumented immigrant children are
educated in public elementary and secondary schools in San Diego County annually. Finding that this figure represents approximately 3% of the total San Diego
County student population and 19.0% of
all students categorized as Limited
English Proficient, OAG estimated that
the annual cost of providing basic education to these undocumented immigrant
students is almost $50 million. Additionally, an average of $8 million is spent on
providing General Education Grant
programs such as special education, gifted
and talented programs, and drug education to undocumented immigrants, and
$2.8 million is attributable to providing
undocumented immigrant students services provided through Limited English
Proficiency Grants. In terms of higher
education, the study noted that in San
Diego County, costs to the public involve

only the California State University system. The study noted further that with an
estimated 85 undocumented immigrants
enrolled at San Diego State University and
one such student enrolled at California
State University at San Marcos, the total
subsidy for these students per year is about
$635,000. OAG thus concluded that the
annual state and local cost of providing
education to undocumented immigrant
students in San Diego County is approximately $60 million.
The study also examined the cost of
providing social services for undocumented immigrants, noting that undocumented immigrants utilize publiclyprovided social services to a very limited
extent given that social services have typically been reserved for legal residents.
However, the study examined the two
programs which provide the majority of
social services to undocumented immigrants: Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), offered through the
state, and the foster care program of the
San Diego County Children's Services
Bureau. The study found that the total
annual state and local amount of AFDC
benefits directed to undocumented immigrants is almost $12 million; the estimated annual County and state cost of
providing in-home social services and
out-of-home placement for undocumented immigrant children is about $1.7
million. The study concluded that the total
annual state and local cost associated with
the provision of social services to undocumented immigrants is $13 million.
As a result, the study concluded that
the cost to state and local governments
associated with processing San Diego
County's undocumented immigrants
through the criminal justice system and
with providing health services, education,
and social services for this population is
$206 million. Because the state and local
governments receive over $60 million in
revenues associated with the employment
and consumer spending of undocumented
immigrants, the net state and local cost of
providing public services to undocumented immigrants in San Diego County
is approximately $146 million.
Report F-105 (June 1992). As part of
its examination of the state's general purpose financial statements for the fiscal
year ending June 30, I 99 I, OAG
evaluated the state's internal financial
control structure. This study of the control
structure was undertaken to allow OAG to
express an opinion on the adequacy of the
state's general purpose financial statements; determine the extent of compliance
with federal grant requirements, laws, and
regulations; and determine compliance
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with state laws and regulations that could
materially affect the general purpose
financial statements. The twenty agencies
audited represented approximately 61 %
of the state's revenues and approximately
60% of the state's spending during the
fiscal year.
According to OAG, the state loses millions of dollars each year because of inadequate financial control procedures.
Additionally, poor accounting practices
have caused confusion about the state's
financial condition among the state's own
financial decisionmakers, the outside investment community, and the federal
government. In its review of financial
operations of statewide concern, OAG
discovered several major shortcomings in
the state's internal controls and financial
reporting systems. For example, because
of the state's failure to use generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in
its reporting of the execution of its budget,
Califorma inconsistently reports its financial condition. The state's true financial
condition is also obscured by the use of
different accounting principles in the
preparation of financial reports by the
state Controller's Office and the Department of Finance. In addition, OAG found
that the state must make numerous adjustments to its financial statements to prepare
them in accordance with nationally recognized GAAP so that they are comparable
to the financial statements of other states
and acceptable to the investment community and the federal government.
OAG also reported on numerous other
problems of statewide concern, including
the following:
-California faces a possible liability to
the federal government of as much as $24
million for profits it has accumulated in
the state's internal service funds between
July 1, 1984, and June 30, I 991.
-For the last six years, the state has
been unable to produce financial reports
and audited financial statements within
six months of the end of the fiscal year, as
is required by the Government Finance
Officers Association.
-For the past two years, the state has
not included combining statements by
fund type in its audited financial statements, as is required by the Governmental
Accounting and Financial Reporting
Standards issued by the Governmental
Accounting Standards Board.
-The lack of a central record of information regarding the state's leases requires the state to spend unnecessary additional time to prepare its financial statement disclosures required by GAAP for
those lease commitments.
-The state's grants, certain contracts,
37
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and interagency agreements are not routed
through the Department of General Services to assure their validity.
-The state's method of accounting for
federal assistance does not provide sufficient information on expenditures of
federal funds because it does not record its
expenditures by federal program. As a
result, the state is unable to present a
schedule of federal assistance that shows
total expenditures for each federal assistance program, as is required by the federal Office of Management and Budget.
-District Agricultural Associations,
which are organized to hold fairs and expositions, are not treated as part of the
state reporting entity, despite the Legislative Counsel's opinion that such Associations are state agencies and that money
they spend is state money.
-The State Administrative Manual
fails to require numerous agencies to submit reconciliations and reports of accruals.
The OAG report also provides detailed
information on specific weaknesses in
control over financial activities and
problems in compliance with state and
federal regulations in a number of state
agencies. For example, in the Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency, the
Department of Motor Vehicles does not
have sufficient control over the collection
of dishonored checks, which totalled approximately $13.4 million as of June 30,
1991, and the Stephen P. Teale Data Center continues to have inadequate methods
for inventory and accounting for equipment and intangible assets. In the area of
educational programs, OAG notes that the
California Student Aid Commission does
not ensure the adequacy of efforts to collect on defaulted student loans that the
Commission has purchased. As to general
government agencies, the Department of
Personnel Administration is unable to ensure that it properly accounts for the
deferred compensation program. As of
March 1992, 21 months after it contracted
with a firm to provide recordkeeping services, the Department was not yet able to
adequately monitor the program. In the
Health and Welfare Agency, the efforts of
the Department of Health Services to collect the costs it has incurred in the
monitoring and remediation of hazardous
waste sites are inadequate. Within the
legislative,judicial, and executive areas of
state government, OAG noted that the
Board of Equalization is unable to ensure
that unapplied credit balances are
processed in compliance with state law.
OAG also identified tax refund problems
in the bank and corporate tax system of the
Franchise Tax Board in the State and Consumer Services Agency.
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Report No. P-029 (June 1992) was
prepared by OAG to evaluate the Department of Insurance's (DOI) regulatory
practices aimed at early detection of
problems that can lead to an insurer's insolvency. OAG reviewed the pertinent
laws, regulations, and policies relating to
DO I's regulatory system; information was
gathered by interviewing personnel of
DO I's financial analysis division, field examination division, claims services
bureau, and conservation and liquidation
division. The audit also included an
evaluation of the Department's regulatory
system through a review of fourteen insolvent insurers, of which nine were incorporated in California.
As part of its duties, DOI is responsible
for the protection of policyholders,
beneficiaries, and other members of the
public from losses arising from insurance
company insolvencies. DOI attempts to
provide this protection by screening
would-be entrants into the field of insurance, analyzing insurers' financial
statements, conducting field examinations, regulating insurance rates, investigating consumer complaints, and enforcing compliance with the California Insurance Code. To protect California consumers from losses resulting from the insolvency of insurance companies, DOI
regulates nearly 1,900 insurers and approximately 300,000 individuals licensed
to conduct insurance business in this state.
A.M. Best, an organization that
provides ratings and financial information
on the insurance industry, defines an insolvent insurance company as any insurer
domiciled in the United States against
which the insurance department of its state
of domicile has taken action for reasons of
financial impairment; such state actions
include administrative orders, supervision, suspension, receivership, conservatorship, liquidation, or other actions that
restrict the insurer's freedom to conduct
business. According to an A.M. Best study
cited by OAG, 372 property and casualty
insolvencies occurred nationwide from
1969 through 1990; California ranked
second among the states with 35 insolvencies during that period. Examples of
recent California seizures include Great
Republic Insurance Company [/1:4
CRLR 133 ], Executive Life Insurance
Company, and First Capital Life Insurance
Company of San Diego [ /1:3 CRLR 128].
To combat the problem of insolvent insurers in California, the state established
the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) in 1969 and the California Life Insurance Guarantee Association
(CLIGA) in 1991. These two associations
exist to pay for covered claims of member

property and casualty and life insurers
who become insolvent. All property and
casualty insurers transacting business in
California must belong to CIGA, and all
life insurers doing business in the state
must be members of CLIGA. According
to OAG, CIGA estimates that, as of June
1990, the projected costs for all property
and casualty insolvencies in California
since 1985 will total approximately $ I.I
billion. Cost data for the insolvencies of
life insurers could not be estimated due to
a lack of data available in the short period
since the formation of CLIGA.
OAG's audit revealed several problems in DO I's past regulation of potentially insolvent insurers. According to OAG,
during 1974-91, DOI did not always take
prompt and decisive action when it
detected conditions detrimental to an
insurer's solvency. These conditions include an insurer's questionable investments, improper reinsurance arrangements, improper affiliate transactions,
loss reserve deficiencies, poor underwriting, poor use of managing general agents,
and agents' high balances. OAG emphasized that delays in prompt and effective
regulatory action can increase the costs of
an insurer's insolvencies by allowing the
insurer to continue writing new business
while no or informal corrective action is
pursued; such increased costs are passed
on to the policyholders of healthy companies in the form of higher insurance
rates.
According to OAG, DOI has consistently failed to take advantage of information available through national agencies
and the insurance regulators of other
states. Although many state regulators are
reluctant to share information on financially troubled insurers, California did not
make an adequate effort to gather the information that was available on some
troubled insurers, and often waited for the
domiciliary state to take action. In some
cases, efforts by DOI to screen insurers
applying to transact business in California
were hampered by flaws in the information gathering system. OAG found that
coordination of efforts with agencies such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners were often
ineffective because of DOI's failure to
contact these agencies and/or to adequately document the information received.
OAG made a number of recommendations for the improvement of DO I's work
related to insolvent insurance companies,
including the following:
-DOI should develop guidelines for
corrective action plans to address the
problems of insurers in danger of insol-
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vency. These plans should specify a timeframe for the insurer to correct identified
problems and provide an outline of actions
DOI will take if the insurer does not comply with the corrective action plan.
-The method of investigation of officers, directors, and major stockholders
of insurers applying for new and amended
certificates should be revised to include
periodic requests for information from
other agencies, the development of an
identification system for obtaining information from the SEC about specific indi victuals, and better documentation of the
information obtained.
-DOI should establish a more effective
and assertive communication system with
other state regulators.
-DOI should strengthen its regulatory
practices aimed at questionable investments, improper affiliate transactions,
loss reserve deficiencies, improper reinsurance, poor use of managing general
agents, poor underwriting, and excessive
agents' balances.
According to OAG, DOI has already
made a number of changes aimed at improving its surveillance and regulation of
insurers, including the reorganization of
portions of DOI regulatory staff and the
drafting of a variety of bills designed to
improve regulatory authority over entities
and activities identified as factors in past
insolvencies. (See infra agency report on
DOI for related discussion.)
Report No. P-215 (August 1992)
reviews the University of California's
(UC) executive compensation, benefits,
and offices. OAG's review of the UC encompassed an evaluation of UC programs
that provide compensation and benefits to
UC executives; a review of the relocation
of the UC's administrative offices from
Berkeley to Oakland; and a review of the
costs associated with the UC's Office of
the President (Office) located in Irvine.
The UC is a public, state-supported
institution administered under the authority of the 26-member Board of Regents
(Regents). Pursuant to the California Constitution, the Regents have full powers of
organization and government of the UC,
subject only to the legislative control
necessary to ensure the security of the
UC's funds and the compliance with endowment terms and certain competitive
bidding procedures. The state's general
fund is the principal funding source forthe
UC's instructional programs. Other funding sources include the federal government, which provides funds for research
and three U.S. Department of Energy
laboratories, private gifts, and investment
income. Total UC revenues for fiscal year
I 990-91 were approximately $ I 0.2 bi!-

lion, of which approximately $2.4 billion,
or 23.5%, was supplied by the state.
In its study, OAG reviewed the salaries
and benefits paid by the UC to a sample of
22 top executives. OAG noted that, in an
attempt to improve the competitiveness of
UC's executive compensation, the
Regents have approved a number of salary
increases since 1983; for example, of the
ten executives who had been in their positions since 1983, nine enjoyed salary increases ranging from 21-40% between
July I 983 and July 1984. OAG also found
that some approved salary increases for
fiscal year 1984-85 may have been
greater than UC Regents believed due to
a lack of sufficient detail in the document
used to propose the increases; the actual
average percentage increase in actual
salaries paid for seven executives that year
was 17.1 %, rather than the 10.8% increase
UC President David Gardner claimed the
executives were receiving. OAG additionally noted that-at the time of its auditGardner's total annual compensation, including base salary and various special
allowances and supplements, exceeded
$452,000. The annual compensation of
the remaining 21 executives in OAG's
sample ranged from $131,293 to
$316,551.
With regard to leaves of absence, OAG
found that all six of the executives
reviewed failed to report absences related
to illness or medical appointments; five of
the six failed to report vacation leave
taken. In response to OAG's findings, Associate Vice President Richard West stated
that, under UC's current legal interpretation of wage and hour law, executives
should not be docked for absences of less
than one day. However, OAG noted that
UC policy does not state that executives
may waive the recording of leave time
taken in less than one-day increments.
OAG also reviewed President
Gardner's housing-related assistance and
compensation, noting that when Gardner
became UC President in 1983, he was
granted an exception from occupying
University housing and was provided with
a housing allowance to assist him in
paying the costs of owning his home. As
part of the original housing benefits package Gardner received, the UC agreed to
buy his previous home in Utah, provide
him with a mortgage loan for his new
California home, and pay a cash stipend to
cover his house operation costs. OAG
notes that subsequent changes to the housing package often resulted in additional
benefits to Gardner. OAG discovered that
the UC may have paid Gardner more for
the Utah home than the value of his equity
in it, as Gardner's equity was $15,000 less
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than the UC paid him. OAG also noted
that the UC paid Gardner an average of
$25,020 per year as his housing allowance; a separate compensation for house
operating expenses given to Gardner
during his tenure averaged $39,600 per
year. OAG also found that four other UC
executives each receive a housing allowance of approximately $3,476 per month,
or $41,710 per year.
In terms of moving expenses, OAG
found that the UC paid moving expenses
for Gardner and four of the eight executives reviewed who were appointed during
Gardner's tenure, averaging approximately $14,800 each. In these five cases, an
average of 50.2% of the expenditures was
for items not reimbursable under the UC
policy in effect at the time; OAG notes that
exceptions were granted for these executives. OAG also found that the UC inconsistently reported moving expense payments or reimbursements as taxable gross
income to the executives and taxation
authorities. For example, in one instance
the UC failed to include almost $6,000 of
moving expense payments or reimbursements in one executive's gross income.
In reviewing relocation incentives,
OAG determined that two of the 22 executives reviewed were paid relocation incentives in the form of temporary salary supplements during Gardner's tenure. OAG
also found that-in violation of UC
policy-Gardner and Senior Vice President William Brady approved payment of
one such $30,000 incentive in the absence
of Regent approval.
In reviewing special retirement
programs, OAG found that in addition to
regular contributions to the UC retirement
plan, the UC has provided a number of
special retirement programs to the executives in OAG's sample. For example, for
the Regents' Special Retirement Contribution Program, which is no longer active, the UC changed the contribution rate
from 3% of certain executives' salaries to
3% of their salaries plus housing value.
OAG further noted that as a result of a
change of vesting dates on five nonqualified deferred income plans the UC
entered into with Gardner, the UC will pay
Gardner an estimated $492,607 upon his
retirement instead of the $60,850 it would
have otherwise been obligated to pay.
OAG also discovered that in approving
changes in vesting dates on two other
retirement program agreements, the UC
may be obligated to pay Gardner an additional $327,478. According to OAG, had
the Regents not opted to change the dates
on these agreements the UC would not be
obligated to provide benefits totaling over
$759,000.
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OAG also noted that the UC provides
certain executives with automobile compensation for business purposes. OAG
found that as of April 30, eight of the
executives reviewed had UC-leased
automobiles; seven other executives and
one spouse, who is an approved associate
of the UC, received automobile allowances. According to OAG, in fiscal year
1990-91, the annual cost of lease payments for automobiles ranged from about
$4,500 to $8,500.
In auditing entertainment expenditures
from July 1990 through April 1992, OAG
found that from July 1, 1991 through April
30, 1992, the UC paid $116,039 from its
Administrative Fund for entertainment
hosted by twelve of the 22 executives
reviewed. OAG noted that entertainment
expenditures covered a variety of events,
including a party celebrating the wedding
of a President's Office employee.
OAG noted that several of the executives in OAG's sample frequently entertained other employees and representatives of the Office of the President exclusively. OAG also found that when only
Office employees and representatives
were entertained, the entertainment often
took place close to UC headquarters. According to OAG, it is not economically
prudent to reimburse employees for meals
or entertainment when they are at or in the
vicinity of their workplace.
Further, OAG noted that the UC also
uses the Administrative Fund to reimburse
UC executives for contributions, gifts, and
miscellaneous expenses. OAG found that
from July 1, 1991 through April 30, 1992,
reimbursed expenditures of the executives
reviewed totalled $2,473 for contributions, $11,578 for gifts, and $21,211 for
miscellaneous expenditures.
In its audit of the UC's system of compensating executives for business-related
travel expenses, OAG found that the UC's
general travel policies were not always
helpful in determining whether costs were
legitimate. For example, OAG claimed
that the UC policy which states that only
those travel expenses that are "ordinary
and necessary" are eligible for reimbursement does not clearly define that phrase.
Although OAG found no policies governing the use of frequent-flyer miles earned
while traveling on business, OAG
believes that it is reasonable to expect that
these types of earned miles be used for UC
business; OAG noted one instance when
Gardner used frequent-flyer miles earned
while on UC business to purchase a roundtrip flight to Hong Kong valued at $3,880
for his daughter.
According to OAG, there were several
instances where executives claimed un40

necessary lodging expenses. For example,
Gardner stayed at a San Francisco hotel
for two nights during a Regents meeting
at a cost to the UC of $370, even though
the location of the meeting was approximately ten miles from the UC's Oakland
headquarters. OAG also noted that some
executives used their Administrative Fund
allocation to pay for first-class travel on
business flights; according to OAG, it
does not benefit the UC when its
employees choose first-class travel if
more economical means are available.
Finally, OAG reviewed the circumstances surrounding the move of the
President's Office to new administrative
offices. OAG noted that beginning in
1988, the Office consolidated its operations in the Kaiser building in Oakland
from seven locations in Berkeley. According to OAG, the UC perceived the move
as a way to reduce the overall long-term
cost of its leased space, resolve organizational problems of managing a staff located on multiple sites, and provide the
UC's Berkeley campus with much needed
space. In addition, an office in Irvine was
leased in order to establish a UC presence
in southern California and provide space
for other university functions. OAG noted
that the total cost of the Irvine office over
the UC's five-year lease, including lease
payments, tenant improvements, and furnishings, exceeds $1.2 million, or an average of $240,000 per year. OAG further
noted that because of budget considerations, the UC intends to abandon the Irvine
lease when it expires in January 1993.
To ensure that the UC fulfills its
responsibility to the public and governments that contribute to its funding, OAG
recommended that the UC and, as appropriate, the Regents, take the following
actions in regard to compensation and
benefits for UC executives:
-ensure that any officials approving
executive compensation and benefits
receive accurate and complete information so that the officials can make well-informed decisions and staff can implement
the decisions as the officials intended;
-charge leave balances for unreported
leave taken;
-clarify its policy requiring leave
reporting;
-ensure that the proper officials approve any compensation payments and
exceptions that require approval;
-ensure that it consistently reports all
taxable compensation or reimbursements
for executives to the taxation authorities;
-ensure that it does not grant relocation incentives to executives who do not
relocate as a condition of their employment;

-clarify its policies regarding appropriate entertainment and travel expenditures and decide whether, or the extent
to which, the Administrative Fund should
be used to reimburse meals and lodging
within the vicinity of UC employees'
headquarters;
-clarify its policies regarding whether,
or the extent to which, the Administrative
Fund should be used to entertain
employees of the Office of the President
exclusively;
-ensure that contributions, gifts, and
other miscellaneous expenses that it reimburses are clearly documented and appropriately made; and
-ensure that frequent-flyer bonuses
that executives receive while on official
business are used for the UC's benefit and
not for individual benefit.
While the UC agreed with some of
OAG's recommendations and immediately commenced addressing those recommendations, it disagreed with the following OAG conclusions:
-while OAG questions the accuracy
and sufficiency of information provided to
the Regents when the Regents approved
fiscal year 1984-85 salary increases for
certain executives, the UC believes the
information was correctly conveyed by
Gardner;
-while the UC acknowledges that it
paid two executives at rates higher than
those approved by the Regents, the UC
believes that it paid the executives
amounts to which they were entitled anrl
will seek retroactive approval from the
Regents;
-the UC does not agree that executives
should be required to report absences in
increments of less than one day or that the
UC should reconsider the amount of sick
leave it allows executives to accrue;
-the UC does not agree that it should
reevaluate its policies regarding reimbursement of extraordinary travel and entertainment expenses; and
-the UC does not agree that it should
ensure that its employees use frequentflyer awards that they earn while on UC
business for business purposes only.
Gardner was succeeded as UC President on October 1 by UC Irvine Chancellor Jack Peltason. Just prior to his departure, Gardner issued new rules on spending in response to OAG's report; these
policies include a ban on most first-class
air travel-unless absolutely necessaryand a requirement that entertainment paid
with administrative funds serve "a clear
university business purpose." Although
OAG's findings were described by one
Regent as "extraordinarily immaterial,"
other Regents acknowledged that the audit
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showed "a complete breakdown" in financial oversight and that the Regents had
fallen into "a state of disrepute" with the
public.
Other Audits. Additionally, OAG
produced the following reports during the
past few months:
• Report No. P-135 (June 1992)
reviews the Department of General
Services' procurement and material
management practices;
• Report No. F-104 (June 1992)
reviews the State Treasurer's Statement of
Securities Accountability as of June 30,
1991;
• Report No. P-134 (July 1992)
reviews court services in San Bernardino
County;
• Report No. P-142 (July 1992)
reviews selected areas of the Chino
Unified School District's Building Program;
• Report No. 1-214 (August 1992)
summarizes OAG 's investigations between January 1991 and July 1992 of improper activities ranging from the misuse
of state resources to abuse of official position; and
• Report No. P-141 (September 1992)
reviews the Judges' Retirement System.

■ LEGISLATION
AB 3036 (Eaves) would have required
the Auditor General to study the long-term
financial impact on the State Highway
Account of the conversion of motor
vehicles to low- or zero-emission alternative fuels. This bill died in committee.

COMMISSION ON
CALIFORNIA STATE
GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION AND
ECONOMY (LITTLE
HOOVER COMMISSION)
Executive Director:
Jeannine L. English
Chairperson: Nathan Shapell
(916) 445-2125
he Little Hoover Commission was
created by the legislature in 1961 and
became operational in the spring of 1962.
(Government Code sections 8501 et seq.)
Although considered to be within the executive branch of state government for
budgetary purposes, the law states that
"the Commission shall not be subject to
the control or direction of any officer or
employee of the executive branch except

T

in connection with the appropriation of
funds approved by the Legislature."
(Government Code section 8502.)
Statute provides that no more than
seven of the thirteen members of the Commission may be from the same political
party. The Governor appoints five citizen
members, and the legislature appoints four
citizen members. The balance of the membership is comprised of two Senators and
two Assemblymembers.
This unique formulation enables the
Commission to be California's only truly
independent watchdog agency. However,
in spite of its statutory independence, the
Commission remains a purely advisory
entity only empowered to make recommendations.
The purpose and duties of the Commission are set forth in Government Code
section 8521. The Code states: "It is the
purpose of the Legislature in creating the
Commission, to secure assistance for the
Governor and itself in promoting
economy, efficiency and improved service
in the transaction of the public business in
the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive branch of
the state government, and in making the
operation of all state departments, agencies, and instrumentalities and all expenditures of public funds, more directly
responsive to the wishes of the people as
expressed by their elected representatives .... "
The Commission seeks to achieve
these ends by conducting studies and
making recommendations as to the adoption of methods and procedures to reduce
government expenditures, the elimination
of functional and service duplication, the
abolition of unnecessary services, programs and functions, the definition or
redefinition of public officials' duties and
responsibilities, and the reorganization
and or restructuring of state entities and
programs. The Commission holds hearings about once a month on topics that
come to its attention from citizens, legislators, and other sources.

■ MAJOR PROJECTS
No Room for Johnny: A New Approach to the School Facilities Crisis
(June 1992). According to this Little
Hoover Commission report, California
schools face a dramatic increase in the
K-12 student population through the end
of this decade, with today's 5.1 million
students expected to balloon to 7 million
by the year 2000. Estimates of the construction costs to provide school facilities
for these children range from $30-35 billion, if no cost-saving alternatives are
used. The Commission notes that during a
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period when the state must decide where
to spend its limited resources, schools
must compete with many other infrastructure demands. Additionally, school districts are hindered by a complex facilities
project approval process involving multiple state agencies, certain state policies
which make it difficult for districts to pursue proactive asset management, and a
lack of cohesive communities of interest
to support school construction projects.
According to the Commission, the
state's role as the provider of funds for
school facilities is inappropriate; the state
should not be a "bottomless pocket" for
school facilities spending while the
authority for decisions regarding school
facilities funding is firmly vested at the
local school district level. In spite of the
local control over education, numerous
court decisions have indicated that the
state must act to protect the right of students to equal access to education; it is
California's responsibility to ensure that
the state's various school facilities are
equitable. The Commission suggested
that the Governor and legislature take the
following actions regarding the facilities
funding process:
-modify the Leroy F. Greene State
School Building Lease Purchase program
to return the responsibility of funding new
school facilities to the local school districts, thereby limiting the state's financial
role to assuring equity and providing a
safety net;
-require the state Department of
Education to convene a task force to determine advisory (rather than prescriptive)
standards for adequate, modern school
facilities that can be adopted by the state
in place of the current minimum standards; and
-place a constitutional amendment
before voters to modify the approval
threshold of general obligation bonds in a
manner consistent with the most cost-effective use of the bonds issued.
Even with adequate funds available for
construction of new school facilities, the
Commission found that the state has
created a cumbersome program that micromanages school construction projects,
thus delaying the completion and driving
up the cost of new school facilities. The
state's permit review and planning process
for new school facilities may take 18
months or longer, during which a project
is reviewed by the local school district, the
Department of Education, the Office of
Local Assistance, the State Allocation
Board, and the Office of the State Architect. Delays caused by this process
often add to the cost for new facilities in
both rising land values and in higher con41

